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Abstract
Many concepts are inadequate for serious inquiry, so theorists often seek to engi-
neer new concepts. The method of explication, which involves replacing concepts 
with more fruitful alternatives, is a model of this process. In this paper, I develop an 
account of fruitfulness, the Relevant-Goals Account of Fruitfulness. The account is 
in the spirit of extant proposals, but develops and extends them in important ways. 
In particular, while it applies to explications in general, the account allows us to 
derive substantive details for specific explications. This is achieved through a sup-
plementary view, Contextualism, that specifies which theoretical goals are relevant 
in any given case. I close by discussing how the Relevant-Goals Account fits into the 
dynamic nature of inquiry.
1 Introduction
Many concepts are inadequate for serious inquiry. They may be insufficiently pre-
cise, they may cut across theoretically important distinctions, they may be politically 
charged, or they may be deficient in some other way. To deal with this, theorists 
often seek to refine their concepts. This is called conceptual engineering.
We can think of the method of explication as a model of conceptual engineering 
in inquiry.1 The method involves replacing one concept, the explicandum, with a 
newly constructed counterpart, the explicatum, for some or other theoretical pur-
pose. Explicanda can be folk concepts or concepts from an earlier stage of inquiry; 
and explicata can (but need not) be expressed using the same words as correspond-
ing explicanda. An application of the method is an explication. Explications can be 
performed by anyone or anything capable of undertaking inquiry, including indi-
vidual theorists and institutions.
 * Mark Pinder 
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Following Carnap, it is standard to characterise explicata as being subject to four 
desiderata. In the ideal case, an explicatum is: similar to the explicandum (perhaps 
in the sense of having a similar function or playing a similar theoretical role); exact 
(in the sense of having precise rules of use or a precise definition); fruitful; and sim-
ple. It is not required that an explicatum satisfy these desiderata perfectly,2 only that 
the desiderata be satisfied to “a sufficient degree” (1962: 7). In general, an explica-
tion is successful when the explicatum is both: appropriately similar to the explican-
dum; and better on balance with respect to exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity.
There is a growing consensus that, in constructing an explicatum, fruitfulness 
is particularly important.3 Shepherd and Justus characterise fruitfulness as “the 
agenda” (2015: 388); and Dutilh Novaes and Reck write that “fruitfulness is ulti-
mately the most significant requirement for an explication overall” (2017: 202). 
There are at least two ways to understand such claims. First, fruitfulness might be 
weighted more heavily than the other desiderata, so that a small increase in fruit-
fulness is preferable to a larger increase in (say) exactness. Or, second, fruitfulness 
might subsume other desiderata so that, in particular, exactness and simplicity are 
only desirable as a means to fruitfulness.4 Either way, on such a view, fruitfulness is 
the principal aim when undertaking the method of explication.
If right, we need a substantive account of fruitfulness. In this paper, I motivate 
and develop such an account: the Relevant-Goals Account of Fruitfulness. The 
account is offered within the spirit of recent discussions of fruitfulness, but refines 
and extends them in important ways. On the Relevant-Goals Account, fruitfulness 
is tied to the extent that an explication facilitates progress towards achieving rel-
evant theoretical goals. This is intended as a general account but, importantly, it can 
be used to derive more substantive accounts for specific explications by specifying 
what the relevant theoretical goals are in each case. To this end, I develop a sup-
plementary view, Contextualism, that specifies which theoretical goals are relevant 
in any given case. Finally, I discuss how the Relevant-Goals Account fits into the 
dynamic nature of inquiry.
Let me make several preliminary comments. First, as the focus herein is on fruit-
fulness, I put other desiderata to one side. Second, herein, I will not respond to gen-
eral objections to the method of explication, such as Strawson’s (1963) complaint 
that explication ‘changes the subject’.5 Third, I do not require an explication to 
involve formalisation: actual scientific and philosophical practice often involves the 
2 If explication is a model of conceptual refinement, perfect similarity is moreover undesirable. Cf. 
Dutilh Novaes and Reck’s (2017) ‘paradox of adequate formalization’.
3 Not everyone agrees. In particular, Schupbach (2017) develops ‘Oppenheimian explication’, a method 
designed to illuminate explicanda by maximising similarity to explicandum rather than fruitfulness. 
However, Schupbach accepts Carnap’s understanding of fruitfulness which, I argue in Sect. 2, is too nar-
row. Once we accept a broader notion of fruitfulness, such as that developed herein, we can reconstrue 
Schupbach as seeking an explicatum that is fruitful for the specific purpose of illuminating the explican-
dum. See Pinder (2017b; Sect. 5.1).
4 This claim is more-or-less explicit in e.g. Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017, pp. 199n7, 202), Shepherd 
and Justus (2015, p. 388) and Kitcher (2008, p. 119).
5 For responses, see e.g.: Brun (2016), Carnap (1963), Carus (2007), Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017), 
Justus (2012), Kitcher (2008), Maher (2007), Pinder (2017b, 2019) and Schupbach (2017).
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construction of concepts that are informal or, at least, not fully formalised.6 Fourth, 
I take the method of explication to be normative, rather than descriptive, in the fol-
lowing sense: the method is a model of how theorists should engineer concepts, 
rather than how theorists in fact engineer concepts. I thus use “fruitfulness” as a 
term-of-art that denotes whatever theorists ought to aim for when engineering their 
concepts. Fifth, if we are to have any confidence in the method, we should nonethe-
less expect clear continuity with actual theoretical practice. For this reason, I focus 
the subsequent discussion around a historical case that fits the general structure of 
the method of explication. I call it the planet case.7
In the previous century, there was no accepted definition for the concept of planet. 
It was explicitly accepted that the concept—call it planetold—had nine canoni-
cal instances, Mercury through to Pluto, and a number of canonical non-instances, 
such as the Sun, the Moon, asteroids, etc. However, in the early twenty first cen-
tury, astronomers discovered several ‘trans-Neptunian objects’, such as Eris. These 
objects were similar in relevant respects both to Pluto and to asteroids, and thus 
seemed to be borderline cases of planetold. As a result, in 2006, the International 
Astronomical Union (IAU) engineered a new concept, explicitly defined in terms of 
key properties of celestial objects, to replace planetold and facilitate a more princi-
pled classification of Pluto and other celestial objects.
Simplifying somewhat, the IAU considered two candidate explicata, planetdraft 
and planetnew, defined along the following lines.8
A celestial object x falls under planetdraft iff:
(a)  x orbits the sun; and
 (b)   x is sufficiently large for its own gravity to have formed it into a sphere.
A celestial object x falls under planetnew iff:
(a) x orbits the sun;
  (b) x is sufficiently large for its own gravity to have formed it into a sphere; and
        (c) x has cleared its neighbourhood of debris.
Both Pluto and Eris fall under planetdraft; neither fall under planetnew.
Following a vote, the IAU replaced planetold with planetnew: the institution 
and its members now use planetnew for celestial taxonomisation, instead of using 
planetold. As such, the IAU count as having explicated planetold. A key question 
is whether the IAU made the right choice—whether planetnew is more fruitful than 
planetdraft. To answer this question, we need an account of fruitfulness.
6 Cf. Brun (2016: 1217f), Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017: 673).
7 See Tyson (2009) for historical discussion.
8 See International Astronomical Union (2006a, b).
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2  Previous Proposals
Carnap characterises fruitfulness thus:
The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of 
many universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, 
logical theorems in the case of a logical concept). (1962: 7)
For example, Carnap writes that the nonlogical concept temperature “has proved 
its great fruitfulness by the fact that it occurs in many important laws” (p. 14), such 
as the ideal gas law; and he hints that Frege’s and Russell’s set-theoretic definitions 
of ordinary arithmetical concepts (such as zero, one, addition, etc.) are fruitful 
because, “[o]n the basis of this interpretation of the arithmetical terms, Peano’s axi-
oms [of arithmetic] become provable theorems in logic” (p. 17).
Carnap’s proposal can be understood to consist of two independent claims9:
 (C1) A concept is fruitful insofar as it furthers the aims of empirical and logical 
inquiry.
 (C2) The aim of empirical and logical inquiry is to formulate (and test, prove, etc.) 
universal statements (empirical laws and logical theorems).10
Now, the goal in the present paper is to find an account of fruitfulness that can serve 
as the aim for conceptual engineering in inquiry in general. However, for two rea-
sons, Carnap’s proposal is not, as it stands, suitable for this particular task. First, 
(C1) focuses only on empirical and logical inquiry. But, as illustrated by much of 
philosophy, inquiry need be neither empirical nor logical—some inquiry is, for 
example, conceptual or normative. Second, contrary to (C2), the aims of some areas 
of empirical inquiry are not best understood in terms of universal statements. As 
Kitcher writes, Carnap’s proposal “doesn’t suit parts of the physical sciences, and 
[is] deeply problematic for the biological, earth, and human sciences” (2008: 115). 
Such sciences do not trade in the kind of universal statements that are more familiar 
in, say, classical physics and mathematics.
Can we amend Carnap’s account in some way? Kitcher proposes an amendment, 
intended to yield an account of fruitful concepts in science:
 (K1) A concept is fruitful (qua science) insofar as it furthers the aims of science.
 (K2) The aim of science is to provide “answers to significant questions, where the 
sources of significance are various, sometimes practical, sometimes in terms 
of the satisfaction of disinterested curiosity” (2008: 115).
10 As an anonymous reviewer notes, Carnap later explicitly denied that all scientific laws are universal: 
there are also statistical laws (1966: 3). This does not affect the criticism that follows; in general, the sci-
ences are not best understood in terms of laws, whether universal or statistical. See e.g. Kitcher (2008: 
119–122).
9 See e.g. Kitcher (2008).
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As science is only one area of inquiry, this proposal as it stands is not a suitable 
account of the aim of conceptual engineering in inquiry in general. But the proposal 
is easily generalised:
 (K1′) A concept is fruitful insofar as it furthers the aims of inquiry.
 (K2′) The aim of inquiry is to provide answers to significant questions.
Now, this proposal has a twofold benefit. On the one hand, the idea of ‘answering 
significant questions’ is general enough to apply to any given field of inquiry: with 
enough care, most significant theoretical advances might be construed as answers 
to significant questions. But nonetheless, the proposal can be used to derive more 
substantive accounts of fruitfulness for specific fields of inquiry, by specifying what 
counts as a significant question in those fields. For example, in assessing an explica-
tum for the concept gene, Kitcher highlights
four questions on which that explication might bear, ranging from issues of 
principally philosophical import to those that affect everyday biological 
research: (1) Can one reduce genetics to physics and chemistry […]? (2) Is 
it possible to give a sense to the locution ‘gene for X’ […] without lapsing 
into genetic determinism? (3) How can we discover the genes in a completely 
sequenced genome? (4) How does one distinguish genomes according to their 
relative complexity? (pp. 115–116)
These questions add clear, substantive detail to what counts as fruitfulness in this 
particular case. In general, then, the proposal promises to combine generality with 
substantive detail.
A less attractive aspect of the proposal—which applies mutatis mutandis to all 
those considered above—is its appeal to the aims of inquiry. There are least two 
concerns here. Firstly, it is unclear that inquiry as such has any aims at all; perhaps, 
instead, it is only theorists that have aims.11 There might, for example, be no nonar-
bitrary way to aggregate theorists’ aims and practices to ground an aim for inquiry 
as such.12 Secondly, even if inquiry as such does have aims, it is unclear that we 
have easy epistemic access to what those aims are. It is certainly not obvious that 
inquiry, over and above the theorist, aims to answer significant questions; nor that it 
aims for truth, knowledge, empirical adequacy, or anything else.
Concerns about the aims of inquiry, while far from decisive, are easily circum-
vented: the appeal to such aims can be bypassed. Consider Dutilh Novaes and 
Reck’s proposal that, when performing an explication, the “goal is to produce new 
11 See, e.g., Rowbottom (2014).
12 As an anonymous referee points out, individual inquiries might have aims—to answer a particu-
lar question, to solve a particular problem, or something else. Plausibly, in such a case, the aim of the 
inquiry is grounded in the aims or practices of those undertaking the inquiry: if I aim to determine what 
‘fruitfulness’ should be, then the aim of my inquiry is likewise to determine what ‘fruitfulness’ should 
be. This observation, however, does not help us to aggregate theorists’ aims and practices to ground an 
aim for inquiry as such.
 M. Pinder 
1 3
knowledge about the phenomena to which the explicandum pertains” (2017: 206). 
This suggests:
 (DNR)  A concept is fruitful insofar as it facilitates the production of new knowledge 
about the phenomena to which it pertains.
In contrast to the previous proposals, (DNR) does not characterise fruitfulness in 
terms of the aims of inquiry. So we can accept (DNR), and be guided by it, without 
committing to the claim that inquiry as such has aims.
However, while (DNR) is an improvement upon (K1ʹ)–(K2ʹ) in this respect, it 
lacks the twofold benefit. It is perhaps the case that (DNR) is general enough to 
apply to any given field of inquiry (although, given the appeal to knowledge, nor-
mative fields such as ethics may be difficult cases). But, in contrast, (DNR) does 
not provide a clear strategy for deriving more substantive accounts of fruitfulness 
for specific fields of inquiry. For any given explication, according to (DNR), one is 
simply to look for the production of knowledge. There is nothing we can plug into 
(DNR) to obtain a more substantive, detailed account; there is no obvious way to 
recover the details we saw in the case of gene above.
None of the concerns raised here are decisive. But they are suggestive. And, in 
what follows, I build on them to develop the Relevant-Goals Account of Fruitfulness.
3  The Relevant‑Goals Account of Fruitfulness
I state the account in Sect. 3.1, develop it in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3, and give an example 
in Sect. 3.4.
3.1  The Account
Let me begin with a bald statement of the account.
The Relevant-Goals Account of Fruitfulness.
   •  An explicatum is fruitful insofar as its replacement of the correspond-
ing explicandum would facilitate, through the ordinary course of inquiry, 
progress towards achieving relevant theoretical goals.
   •   Given multiple fruitful candidate explicata for a single explicatum, the 
most fruitful candidate is that whose replacement of the explicandum 
would facilitate, through the ordinary course of inquiry, most progress 
towards achieving relevant theoretical goals.
On this proposal, the theoretical goals that are relevant to a particular explication 
provide substantive criteria against which to measure fruitfulness when performing 
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that particular explication.13 I will say more about how I am understanding theo-
retical goals in Sect. 3.2. But examples include: to formulate universal generalisa-
tions; to explain some particular phenomenon; or to develop a principled taxonomy 
of celestial objects.14
Notice that relevant theoretical goals are analogous to Kitcher’s significant ques-
tions. I prefer to talk of goals rather than questions because, in some cases, it is dif-
ficult to formulate appropriate questions. In the planet case, theorists are plausibly 
guided in part by the theoretical goal to develop a principled taxonomy of celes-
tial objects. Yet it is unclear how to reformulate this goal as a question. Perhaps: 
Is there a principled taxonomy of celestial objects?; or What are the details of a 
principled taxonomy of celestial objects?. But answering the former question need 
not involve developing a principled taxonomy of celestial objects; and answering the 
latter seems, if anything, to go beyond it. In contrast, questions are easily translated 
into goals: given a question, Q, we can formulate a corresponding goal, to answer Q. 
Thus, overall, I prefer to talk of relevant theoretical goals.
There are two principal ways that such progress can be facilitated towards achiev-
ing theoretical goals. Firstly, progress is facilitated if the goal is achieved by the very 
act of replacing the explicandum with the explicatum: the goal to provide a prin-
cipled extension for “planet” was achieved by the very act of replacing planetold 
with planetnew. Secondly, progress is facilitated if a step is made towards achieving 
the goal by the act of replacing the explicandum with the explicatum: the goal to 
formulate empirical laws is at best brought a step closer by performing that replace-
ment. There is no requirement that those performing the explication know that such 
a step has been successfully made so long as, in typical cases, theorists have a good 
idea of what counts as a move in the right direction. To say that progress is facili-
tated through the ordinary course of inquiry is to rule out atypical cases in which an 
explication results in progress towards achieving relevant theoretical goals in devi-
ant ways—cases, for example, in which a ‘bad’ explication nonetheless inspires a 
theorist to look at a problem in a new and illuminating way.
When deciding between multiple fruitful candidate explicata, one compares how 
much progress would result from replacing the explicandum with each candidate. 
There is no general algorithm for such comparisons—progress is typically quali-
tative rather than quantitative—and relative fruitfulness must be assessed, using 
academic judgement, on a case-by-case basis.15 Moreover, different theorists, even 
those who share theoretical goals, may make different judgements on a given case. It 
does not automatically follow that one of the theorists is mistaken; there may always 
13 Thus, one can effectively obtain each of Carnap’s, Kitcher’s and Dutilh Novaes and Reck’s views as 
special cases. This is achieved by considering cases in which the relevant theoretical goals are, respec-
tively: to formulate universal statements; to answer significant questions; and to produce new knowledge 
about the phenomena to which the explicatum pertains. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging 
me to make this explicit.
14 Here and below: a taxonomy or extension is principled insofar as it coheres with contemporary under-
standing of the relevant phenomena.
15 Cf. Kuhn (1977) on theory choice.
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be a subjective element to such judgements. Nonetheless, in many cases, the judge-
ments will be clear-cut. See Sect. 3.4 for an illustration of this process.
Finally, note that I make the simplifying assumption throughout that, in any given 
explication, relevant theoretical goals are to be weighted equally. Ultimately, we 
might drop the assumption. Suppose that, in judging candidate explicata for plan-
etold, we took the most significant factor to be whether candidates provided a prin-
cipled division amongst celestial objects. This would be compatible with thinking 
that—all else being equal—a candidate explicatum that facilitated the formulation 
of empirical laws would have been better than one that did not. In such a case, there 
would have been (at least) two relevant theoretical goals—to develop a principled 
taxonomy of celestial objects and to formulate empirical laws—with the former 
weighted more heavily than the latter. However, the introduction of different weight-
ings complicates the discussion of the account, without making the underlying ideas 
any more perspicuous. So, for present purposes, I put weighting aside.
3.2  Theoretical Goals
What, in the relevant sense, are theoretical goals? As a first gloss, one might be 
tempted to characterise theoretical goals simply as goals pertaining to some or other 
theoretical matter. However, herein, I have a thicker notion in mind. When perform-
ing explications, theorists should not aim simply to achieve goals that pertain to 
some or other theoretical matter. In addition, theorists should aim to thereby make 
appropriate progress. Now, what constitutes progress in inquiry plausibly varies 
between different fields: progress in ethics may look nothing like progress in astron-
omy. To keep things manageable, I will focus on theoretical goals in science. That 
is, in this subsection, I will sketch a view of theoretical goals in the specific sense of: 
goals the achievement of which would lead to progress in scientific inquiry.16
I have already given several examples of what I am taking to be theoretical goals: 
to explain some phenomenon; to formulate universal generalisations; to formu-
late empirical laws; to develop a taxonomy of celestial objects; to provide a prin-
cipled extension for “planet”. A notable feature of such goals is that, if achieved, 
they might genuinely lead to better scientific theories: if phenomenon P falls within 
the scope of some scientific theory, then that theory is ceteris paribus better if it 
explains P; all else being equal, a scientific theory that includes (true) universal gen-
eralisations or empirical laws is better than one that does not; and our best astro-
nomical theories are overall improved by the development of a principled taxonomy 
of celestial objects and a principled extension for “planet”. I recommend, then, that 
we understand theoretical goals in terms of theoretical values.
Theoretical values are general characteristics of good scientific theories, such 
as: internal consistency; coherence (with other accepted theories); evidential accu-
racy (i.e. fit with the evidence); scope (i.e. applicability to a wide range of phenom-
ena and/or cases); explanatory power; simplicity; and so on. Roughly, the more 
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify this.
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theoretical values a theory has, and the greater extent to which it has them, the bet-
ter the theory. But there are complications: some values might be weighted more 
heavily than others (such as internal consistency over simplicity), and values might 
sometimes conflict (increasing scope can decrease evidential accuracy). There are 
also important questions about what the theoretical values in fact are, how they are 
related, and why they are valued. For present purposes, however, I put such compli-
cations and questions aside.17
We can give an account of theoretical goals in terms of theoretical values: a goal 
pertaining to some scientific theory is theoretical insofar as achievement of that goal 
would ipso facto enhance some theoretical value(s) of that theory. Call this view 
Value-Directedness. More precisely, where T is a scientific theory:
A goal is theoretical with respect to T insofar as: ceteris paribus, achieve-
ment of that goal would ipso facto transform T into a theory that is better with 
respect to some theoretical value(s) than T.
For example, the formulation of new universal generalisations and empirical laws 
may ipso facto increase the scope of a theory. That is, whereas T may only apply to 
individual cases the transformed theory will apply across the board; so, other things 
being equal, the transformed theory will have greater scope than T. According to 
Value-Directedness, then, to formulate universal generalisations and to formulate 
empirical laws will in such cases count as theoretical goals.
Similarly for the goal to explain phenomenon P. If P falls within the scope of 
a theory that does not explain it, then providing that theory with the resources to 
explain P may ipso facto enhance its explanatory power. That is, whereas T might 
not explain P, the transformed theory will do; so, other things being equal, the trans-
formed theory will have greater explanatory power than T. According to Value-
Directedness, then, to explain phenomenon P will in such cases count as theoretical 
goals.
Finally, consider the goals to develop a principled taxonomy of celestial objects 
and to provide a principled extension for “planet”. The concept planetold was not 
principled, in the sense that it did not cohere well with contemporary understanding 
of the solar system: given the discovery of Eris, contemporary understanding sug-
gested that planetold did not denote an astronomically important category. So, one 
effect of developing a principled taxonomy of celestial objects, and of providing a 
principled extension for “planet”, was that the planetary sciences would henceforth 
cohere better with astronomical theories more generally; a theory of planetary for-
mation, say, would henceforth cohere better with a theory of the evolution of solar 
systems. Thus, achievement of those goals would ipso facto increase the coherence 
of a variety of astronomical theories. So according to Value-Directedness, for the 
IAU, to develop a principled taxonomy of celestial objects and to provide a princi-
pled extension for “planet” counted as theoretical goals.
17 The classic exposition of theoretical values is Kuhn (1977). For development and discussion, see e.g.: 
Laudan (2004), Douglas (2013), McMullin (2014) and Keas (2018).
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Implicit in the above comments is the thought that goals do not count as theoreti-
cal simpliciter, but only with respect to some scientific theory. Providing a princi-
pled extension for “planet” may enhance the scope of a theory of planetary science, 
but is unlikely to enhance any theoretical values of a theory of (say) genetics. Gen-
eralising, we can also say that a goal is theoretical with respect to a whole scientific 
field. Successfully unifying quantum and relativistic physics would ipso facto trans-
form theories in both fields, such that the new theories would by-and-large be better 
with respect to (say) coherence than the old theories. The goal to unify quantum 
and relativistic physics, then, is theoretical with respect to the fields of quantum and 
relativistic physics.
As it stands, Value-Directedness may not generalise to non-scientific fields of 
inquiry. Several questions are relevant here. What exactly are scientific theories? To 
what extent are they like the theories we find in other fields of inquiry? Are theo-
retical values applicable to non-scientific theories and, if so, to what extent? Does 
progress in other disciplines consist of developing better theories? If we think of 
philosophy as broadly continuous with science, then we might think that the tradi-
tional theoretical values apply mutatis mutandis in philosophy.18 But, in contrast, 
if we focus instead on the normative nature of philosophical inquiry, then many 
of the traditional theoretical values seem inappropriate. It is unclear that we can 
straightforwardly measure progress in ethics with reference to evidential accuracy or 
explanatory power, for example. These are deep issues about the nature of scientific 
and other inquiry, and I cannot resolve them here. For present purposes, I settle for 
Value-Directedness, construed only as an account of theoretical goals in scientific 
inquiry.
3.3  Relevance
The Relevant-Goals Account ties fruitfulness to relevant theoretical goals. So which 
theoretical goals are relevant? I offer an answer to this question, Contextualism, in 
this subsection.19
Explications are performed for particular theoretical purposes. So, given that 
fruitfulness is the principal desideratum for explicata, it makes good sense to meas-
ure fruitfulness against those purposes. Contextualism is intended to capture this 
thought by tying relevant theoretical goals to whoever or whatever is performing 
a given explication. More precisely, Contextualism is the view that, for any given 
explication, the relevant theoretical goals are the explicator’s theoretical goals. How 
this is to be understood depends on what sort of entity—say, theorist or institution—
is performing the explication.
18 See e.g. Ladyman (2012).
19 An alternative view is that the relevant theoretical goals are the objective aims of the corresponding 
field of inquiry—be it science, philosophy, or something else. As indicated in Sect. 2, however, I prefer 
to avoid building such objective aims into our account of fruitfulness.
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First, suppose that an individual theorist is performing an explication. Then: the 
explicator’s theoretical goals are the personal theoretical goals of that individual the-
orist qua performer of the explication. This requires explanation.
Let personal theoretical goals be an individual theorists’ theoretical goals. For 
example, some astronomers may have a theoretical goal to explain the properties of 
Pluto; some may have a theoretical goal to provide a principled taxonomy of trans-
Neptunian objects; some may have a theoretical goal to develop universal gener-
alisations about different varieties of celestial objects; and so on.20 An individual 
theorist may have many different theoretical goals, and these goals may change over 
time.
Now, theorists often seek piecemeal progress, tackling only some of their per-
sonal theoretical goals at any given time. Accordingly, we can distinguish between 
the personal theoretical goals of a theorist as such, and those of a theorist qua per-
former of an explication. The personal theoretical goals of a theorist as such are 
standing theoretical goals towards which, in general, she is working; the personal 
theoretical goals of a theorist qua performer of an explication are those theoretical 
goals towards which, in performing that explication, she is working. For example, 
suppose that Brown sought singlehandedly to explicate planetold. She might have 
had various standing personal theoretical goals—such as, say, to provide a princi-
pled taxonomy of trans-Neptunian objects and to predict and explain the conditions 
at the very edge of the solar system. These were Brown’s personal theoretical goals 
as such. However, in relation to the explication of planetold, Brown may have had 
a more focused set of theoretical goals—say, to provide a principled taxonomy of 
trans-Neptunian objects and, in particular, to determine which, if any, trans-Neptu-
nian objects are to fall under “planet”, with no reference at all to the conditions at 
the edge of the solar system. In this case, then, the explicator’s theoretical goals—
and thus, according to Contextualism, the relevant theoretical goals—would be: to 
provide a principled taxonomy of trans-Neptunian objects; and to determine which, 
if any, trans-Neptunian objects are to fall under “planet”.
Second, suppose that an institution is performing the explication. Then: the expli-
cator’s theoretical goals are the institutional theoretical goals of that institution qua 
performer of the explication. Here, let institutional theoretical goals be theoretical 
goals that are (explicitly) endorsed by research groups, centres or institutions. For 
example, the Centre for the Study of the Senses, which is hosted by the Institute of 
Philosophy at the School of Advanced Study at the University of London, states that 
its
overall aim is to achieve a coherent framework to accommodate the welter of 
recent findings that have revised our understanding of how the different senses 
contribute to our perception of the environment, and awareness of ourselves.21
21 From http://philo sophy .sas.ac.uk/centr es/cense s. Accessed 6th March 2019.
20 In this subsection, I generally omit the defence of claims that such-and-such goals are theoretical.
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This goal is theoretical given that, ceteris paribus, achieving it would enhance the 
coherence of the plurality of theories that we might collectively label contemporary 
sense sciences.
Just like individuals, institutions often seek piecemeal progress, tackling only 
some of their institutional theoretical goals at any given time. Accordingly, we can 
distinguish between the theoretical goals of an institution as such, and those of an 
institution qua performer of an explication. For example, the Centre for the Study 
of the Senses has standing institutional theoretical goals as quoted above. But, on 
a given occasion, the Centre might seek in particular to provide a set of clearly-
defined taxa of interoceptive senses (e.g. ‘pain’, ‘hunger’, ‘itchiness’) that reflect 
current understanding without reference to how our senses contribute to our per-
ception of the environment. In such a case, the explicator’s theoretical goals—and 
thus, according to Contextualism, the relevant theoretical goals—would be (say): to 
achieve a coherent framework to accommodate the recent findings that have revised 
our understanding of our awareness of ourselves; and to provide a set of clearly-
defined taxa of interoceptive senses (e.g. ‘pain’, ‘hunger’, ‘itchiness’) that reflect 
current understanding.
On this view, explicators have a significant degree of control over which of their 
theoretical goals are relevant, and thus over the measure of fruitfulness that applies 
in a given case. This does not imply that anything goes. Firstly, as relevant theoreti-
cal goals are always theoretical goals, they must (by Value-Directedness) be directed 
towards the improvement of certain theories in certain respects. An explicator can-
not simply decide to uniformly degrade theories in the name of fruitfulness. Sec-
ondly, additional normative factors, external to the method of explication, may con-
strain explicators’ theoretical goals. For example, many contemporary philosophers 
would judge the following theoretical goal to be a dead-end: to reduce all scientific 
statements to statements about sense-data. If that is right then, on grounds inde-
pendent to the method of explication, explicators ought not to have that goal. So, 
faced with a contemporary theorist who (say) seeks to explicate object as a first step 
to reducing all scientific statements to statements about sense-data, we might say 
two things: that, given her specific context, there may be fruitful explicata available; 
but that, nonetheless, there are good reasons not to be in that context.
That, then, is Contextualism—the view that the theoretical goals relevant to an 
explication are the explicator’s theoretical goals. A few brief comments in its favour 
are in order. First, as noted above, Contextualism is a natural view given that expli-
cations are performed for specific theoretical purposes. Given Contextualism, those 
specific theoretical purposes are modelled by the relevant theoretical goals. Second, 
Contextualism provides a recipe for deriving clear, substantive and detailed accounts 
of fruitfulness for specific explications. The Relevant-Goals Account is thus general 
enough to apply to any given explication. And, by providing additional details about 
the explicator’s theoretical goals, we can derive a substantive measure for fruitful-
ness in that case. This parallels the twofold benefit of Kitcher’s account, discussed 
in Sect. 2.
Third, given Contextualism, we have good reason to think that the Relevant-Goals 
Account can be practically helpful for those performing explications. Theoretical 
goals are the sort of thing that can guide an explication, but only if those performing 
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the explication have straightforward epistemic access to which theoretical goals are 
their guides. And given Contextualism, those performing an explication do have 
such epistemic access, because they have epistemic access to their theoretical goals. 
In large part, this is simply because those performing explications—whether indi-
vidual theorists or institutions—determine what their theoretical goals are in each 
case. Given Contextualism, the Relevant-Goals Account provides practical guidance 
for the performance of explications.
3.4  Example
The IAU considered two candidate explicata when explicating planetold, planetdraft 
and planetnew, ultimately choosing planetnew. I now argue that, on the present pic-
ture, this was the right choice.
The IAU states several aims on its website, at least of which two are theoretical 
goals: to provide “unambiguous [i.e. clearly defined] astronomical nomenclature” 
(achieving which would ceteris paribus ipso facto enhance the scope of astronomical 
theories); and to define “fundamental astronomical and physical constants” (achiev-
ing which would ceteris paribus ipso facto enhance the evidential accuracy of astro-
nomical theories).22 These are the IAU’s institutional theoretical goals as such. In 
explicating planetold, however, the IAU was working only towards the former. So, 
of these, only
(I) to provide clearly-defined astronomical nomenclature
was a relevant theoretical goal in the planet case.
The IAU also had a more specific aim. In the resolution documenting the explica-
tion, the IAU writes that:
[…] it is important that our nomenclature for objects [in planetary systems] 
reflect our current understanding. This applies, in particular, to the designation 
“planets”. […] Recent discoveries lead us to create a new definition, which we 
can make using currently available scientific information. (2006b: 1)
More succinctly and explicitly, the IAU is here endorsing the following goal:
(II)  to provide a taxonomy for celestial objects that reflects our current understand-
ing (with specific reference to “planet”).
This goal is theoretical: achieving it would ipso facto enhance the coherence of the 
planetary sciences. As such, it was a relevant theoretical goal in the planet case.
Accepting that (I) and (II) are the only relevant theoretical goals, in order to 
determine which candidate promised to be most fruitful we must consider the extent 
22 From https ://www.iau.org/about /. Accessed 6th March 2019. Other aims include: to organise scientific 
meetings; to promote educational activities; and to discuss the possibility of “future international large-
scale facilities”.
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to which replacing planetold with planetdraft or planetnew would have facilitated 
progress towards achieving (I) and (II).
First, consider (I). Planetold did not serve to underpin clearly-defined nomencla-
ture: as the concept is defined only by heterogeneous instances and non-instances, 
it fails to classify many celestial objects in our solar system and provides no princi-
pled basis for extension to objects in other solar systems. In virtue of their explicit 
definitions, in contrast, both planetdraft and planetnew were well-placed both to clas-
sify the celestial objects in our solar system and to be extended to objects in other 
solar systems. Neither candidate underpins a perfectly clear nomenclature. There are 
some difficulties spelling out: how spherical an object must be to satisfy condition 
(b) of both definitions; and to what extent an object must have cleared its object of 
debris to satisfy condition (c) of the definition of planetnew.23 Either of these dif-
ficulties could, in principle, have led to unclarity in nomenclature as more celestial 
objects were discovered, but there is no a priori reason to think that either candidate 
explicatum would be more likely than the other to lead to such problems. So, by 
replacing planetold with either candidate explicatum, the IAU would have taken a 
clear step towards achieving (I); and the IAU had no reason to predict that either 
replacement would have constituted a greater step. From the IAU’s perspective, 
then: with respect to (I), both planetdraft and planetnew were fruitful, with neither 
being clearly more fruitful than the other.
Second, consider (II). In light of the discovery of Eris and other trans-Neptunian 
objects very similar to Pluto, it was clear that planetold did not reflect contemporary 
understanding of the solar system. As both planetdraft and planetnew were defined in 
terms of well-understood celestial properties, replacing planetold with either candi-
date explicatum would have constituted a step towards achieving (II). That is, with 
respect to (II), both planetdraft and planetnew were fruitful.
However, planetnew was more fruitful than planetdraft. The difference between 
the two concepts is that planetnew contains an additional clause: to fall under 
planetnew, a celestial object x must be such that
(c)  x has cleared its neighbourhood of debris.
Now, while no celestial object in our solar system has cleared its neighbourhood 
of debris completely, it was known that there is significant difference between the 
extent to which Mercury through to Neptune have cleared their neighbourhoods of 
debris, and the extent to which other celestial objects have cleared their neighbour-
hoods of debris.24 Following Soter (2006), let μ be the ratio of the mass of a celestial 
object and the total combined mass of other objects in its neighbourhood. Then the 
value of μ for each of Mercury through to Neptune is over 5 × 103. By comparison, 
23 See Soter (2006).
24 See e.g. Soter (2006) and Stern and Levison (2002). Note that (c) may ultimately need to be adjusted 
to reflect the fact that no celestial object in our solar system has cleared its neighbourhood of debris com-
pletely.
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the value for Pluto and Eris is 0.07 and 0.1 respectively; and the value for the largest 
asteroid in the solar system is 0.33.
Importantly, in a sufficiently mature solar system (such as our own), these differ-
ences in μ-value track a key distinction in our understanding of how that solar sys-
tem evolved. As a solar system evolves, dust and gas orbiting a star will be collected 
up into bodies. At any given distance from the sun, a single dominant body may 
emerge that scatters or subsumes remaining debris in its neighbourhood. In a mature 
solar system, an object with a high μ-value is a dominant body that has reached the 
end of this process; an object with a low μ-value, however, is effectively “stranded in 
[an] arrested stage of development”: the dynamics of the solar system in its mature 
state prevent such an object from becoming dominant in its neighbourhood (Soter 
2006: 2517).
The astronomical details need not concern us here. But, if this is right, then 
planetnew reflected an important aspect of contemporary understanding of celestial 
objects that was not reflected by planetdraft. Replacing planetold with planetnew, 
rather than planetdraft, would thus have been the greater step towards providing a 
taxonomy for celestial objects that reflected contemporary understanding. That is, 
with respect to (II), planetnew was more fruitful than planetdraft.
Overall, then, while both planetnew and planetdraft were fruitful, planetnew was 
more fruitful than planetdraft. Thus, given these two candidate explicata, the IAU 
were right to replace planetold with planetnew.
4  Dynamics
A possible concern about the foregoing is that it presupposes an implausible ‘static’ 
model of inquiry, as if inquiry consists of isolated activities aimed at achieving fixed 
goals. I develop the concern, in Sect. 4.1, as two separate objections. I respond to 
both objections, in Sect. 4.2, by explaining how the Relevant-Goals Account fits into 
the ‘dynamic’ nature of inquiry.
4.1  Two Objections
The first objection is that the Relevant-Goals Account represents theorists (and insti-
tutions) as having fixed theoretical goals towards which they are working. However, 
in reality, inquiry involves the ongoing revision and refining of one’s theoretical 
goals.
For example, in the planet case, the relevant theoretical goal (II), to provide a 
taxonomy for celestial objects that reflects our current understanding (with specific 
reference to “planet”), was only explicitly formulated at the point of explication. 
The goal, however, was not plucked out of thin air; it was the result of the changing 
contexts through which the controversy about the status of Pluto unfolded.25 Upon 
25 See e.g. Tyson (2009).
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discovery of Eris, the principal goal was perhaps just to determine whether Eris is a 
planet. But, given the similarity of Eris to Pluto, this evolved into the goal to deter-
mine whether Pluto is a planet. To bypass the issue, the Hayden Planetarium (in 
2000) changed its displays to use only the relatively uncontroversial designations 
“Terrestrial Planet” (Mercury through to Mars) and “Jovian Planet” (Jupiter through 
to Neptune), without reference to Pluto at all. Media attention turned this into a pub-
lic controversy, which led theorists to seek to determine whether “planet” denotes 
an astronomically useful category. In part due to social pressures supporting the 
designation “planet”, the principal goal evolved further into the goal to provide a 
definition of “planet” that reflects current understanding. It is in this context that 
the IAU voted for planetnew.
This ‘history’ of the theoretical goal (II) remains highly artificial, but is none-
theless sufficient to emphasise that theoretical goals are not fixed. The concern is 
that the Relevant-Goals Account misrepresents the way that theoretical goals change 
through time; and that this misrepresentation is sufficiently severe to undermine the 
account as a model of what theorists should aim for in engineering concepts.
The second objection is that the Relevant-Goals Account represents conceptual 
engineering as being isolated from other theoretical practice, as if theorists (and 
institutions) periodically pause their other activities to engineer a concept. How-
ever, the different activities that constitute an inquiry—reading, thinking, collecting 
and analysing data, formulating arguments, considering objections, discussing with 
colleagues, refining ideas, engineering concepts, etc.—are in fact thoroughly inter-
twined, with the different activities combining to bring about theoretical progress. 
Conceptual engineering is thus embedded within the ongoing activities that consti-
tute an inquiry.
This point can also be brought out by considering the planet case. As noted above, 
the IAU’s definition (a)–(c) is not, as it stands, adequate: none of Mercury through 
to Neptune have completely cleared their orbits of debris. Soter’s clarification of (c), 
discussed in Sect. 3.4, is in effect a further conceptual refinement, a further explica-
tion of the IAU’s explicatum that yields26:
A celestial object x falls under planetsoter iff:
  (a) x orbits the sun;
  (b) x is sufficiently large for its own gravity to have formed it into a sphere; and
  (c) the value of μ for x is high (say, μx > 100).27
It was in performing this further explication that Soter explicitly tied the designation 
“planet” to the evolution of the solar system, highlighting a clear theoretical basis 
for the definition. Now, even in this simple case, the changing definition of “planet” 
is best seen as embedded within broader theoretical work: we cannot clearly separate 
Soter’s refinement of the definition of “planet” from the simultaneous development 
26 See Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017: 201f) for discussion of the iterative nature of explication, the fact 
that “the explicatum of an explication may become the explicandum for another explication”.
27 Soter (2006: 2517) also recommends dropping (b), although for simplicity I leave this point aside 
here.
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of the theory of the evolution of the solar system. The theoretical development is at 
once the precursor to, and consequence of, the redefinition; a justification for, and 
justified by, the redefinition. More generally, the ongoing engineering of concepts is 
embedded within the ongoing development of theories, ideas, data, and so on.
The underlying concern, then, is the same as before—that the Relevant-Goals 
Account misrepresents actual theoretical practice, undermining the account as a 
model of what theorists should aim for in engineering concepts.
4.2  Dynamics and the Method of Explication
As noted at the outset, I see the method of explication as normative: it is a rec-
ommendation for how to go about engineering concepts in inquiry, rather than a 
description of how theorists in fact go about engineering concepts. For this rea-
son, the apparent disconnect between the Relevant-Goals Account and the dynamic 
nature of theoretical practice is only a problem if the disconnect prevents the account 
from being a plausible recommendation.
Now, for the method of explication to be of practical value, it must simplify to 
some extent. A method that explicitly takes into account all of the complexities of 
inquiry would itself be too complex to provide helpful guidance. A simpler method, 
an idealisation that can be adapted on the fly to the situation at hand, is likely to be 
preferable. By analogy, speaking to a new driver in the UK, one might recommend 
that she drive on the left-hand side of the road. The driver can then adapt this advice 
as need be—for example, when navigating narrow lanes on which she is forced to 
drive in the middle of the road, when driving past parked cars which require her to 
move over to the right-hand side, when driving down multiple-lane one-way streets 
at the end of which she wants to turn right, and so on. It would not be helpful, so 
much as overwhelming, to try to take all of these complexities into account when 
offering the initial recommendation to the driver. When recommending a strategy 
for navigating something complex, simplifications are invaluable.
Plausibly, then, the normative nature of the method of explication justifies a cer-
tain degree of simplification. But, according to the objections, the Relevant-Goals 
Account does not so much simplify as misrepresent: the Relevant-Goals Account 
misrepresents a dynamic process as static. If this is right, then the above line of 
response may seem unconvincing. However, contrary to the objections, the Rele-
vant-Goals Account does not misrepresent inquiry. Although the account does not 
make the dynamic nature of inquiry explicit, it does not imply that inquiry is, in the 
relevant sense, static. Let me explain.
First, consider the fact that a theorist’s theoretical goals can change. Contrary to 
the first objection, the Relevant-Goals Account does not in fact represent such theo-
retical goals as fixed; the account says nothing about whether they change or not. 
According to the account, at any given moment, the theoretical goals that are driving 
an explication also serve as the measure of fruitfulness for that explication. If the 
theoretical goals change, then so does the measure. The Relevant-Goals Account 
is thus in principle compatible with the fact that a theorist’s theoretical goals can 
change.
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Second, consider the fact that concepts are not engineered in isolation from a 
theorist’s other theoretical practice. Contrary to the second objection, the Relevant-
Goals Account does not in fact represent conceptual engineering as isolated in this 
way; the account says nothing about the context in which conceptual engineering 
takes place. There may be several other activities going on in concert. The Relevant-
Goals Account says only that, whatever those activities are, we measure the fruitful-
ness of an explicatum against the theoretical goals that are driving the explication. 
The account is in principle compatible with the fact that conceptual engineering is 
embedded within a wide range of other theoretical activities.
So let me say how the Relevant-Goals Account is to be interpreted in practice. 
When a theorist is performing an explication, she should begin by formulating rel-
evant theoretical goals. What is she trying to achieve? What is the intended theo-
retical advance? Her answers to these questions will be heavily informed by what-
ever other relevant theoretical activities she is engaged in. A string theorist trying to 
prove a theorem will have quite different aims from the astronomer trying to develop 
a principled taxonomy of celestial objects. The theorist can proceed by sketching 
some possible definitions for candidate explicata. These may undergo preliminary 
assessment: the more fruitful, the better. It is unlikely that the theorist will be imme-
diately satisfied with her definitions: conceptual engineering is hard. However, sev-
eral options are open to the unsatisfied theorist. Firstly, she might seek to tighten up 
and improve the definitions for her candidate explicata. Secondly, she might try a 
different strategy, seeking brand new candidate explicata. Thirdly, she might adjust 
her theoretical goals in light of what she has learnt. (Perhaps, for example, the string 
theorist realises that the claim she is trying to prove needs to be weakened in some 
way.) Fourthly, she might go back to her other theoretical activities. (Perhaps, for 
example, the string theorist turns back to developing the proof, if only to see just 
what does follow from her definition.) Whatever the details, the theorist continues 
to adjust her theoretical goals, engage in other theoretical activities, and refine her 
candidate explicata until she is satisfied. When she is satisfied, and has settled upon 
an explicatum, then she counts as having performed an explication.
Note that there is no precise moment in this story at which the theorist per-
forms the explication. And there is no guarantee that the end result speaks to the 
theoretical goals she had at the outset. But this merely reflects that her conceptual 
engineering efforts are intertwined with her other activities, all of which are in a 
feedback loop with her theoretical goals. What the Relevant-Goals Account specifi-
cally recommends is that the theorist keep her most up-to-date theoretical goals in 
mind throughout the process. Formulate those goals, refine them, and work towards 
achieving them.
Rather than misrepresenting inquiry as static, then, the Relevant-Goals Account 
de-emphasises its dynamic nature in order to provide a recommendation that can 
be adapted on the fly, as need be. The recommendation is that, when engineering a 
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concept in inquiry, the aim be to make progress towards achieving the explicator’s 
theoretical goals.28
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